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ABSTRACT
A cloud server spent a lot of time, energy and money to train
a Viola-Jones type object detector [1] with high accuracy.
Clients can upload their photos to the cloud server to find ob-
jects. However, the client does not want the leakage of the
content of his/her photos. In the meanwhile, the cloud server
is also reluctant to leak any parameters of the trained object
detectors. 10 years ago, Avidan & Butman introduced Blind
Vision, which is a method for securely evaluating a Viola-
Jones type object detector. Blind Vision uses standard cryp-
tographic tools and is painfully slow to compute, taking a cou-
ple of hours to scan a single image. The purpose of this work
is to explore an efficient method that can speed up the process.
We propose the Random Base Image (RBI) Representation.
The original image is divided into random base images. Only
the base images are submitted randomly to the cloud server.
Thus, the content of the image can not be leaked. In the mean-
while, a random vector and the secure Millionaire protocol
are leveraged to protect the parameters of the trained object
detector. The RBI makes the integral-image enable again for
the great acceleration. The experimental results reveal that
our method can retain the detection accuracy of that of the
plain vision algorithm and is significantly faster than the tra-
ditional blind vision, with only a very low probability of the
information leakage theoretically.
Index Terms— Blind Vision, Random Base Image, Pri-
vacy Preserving, Object Detection
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, widespread smart phones with cameras enable peo-
ple to shot images and videos nearly anytime and any-
This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Founda-
tion of China (Grant NO.61402021, 61402023, 61640216), the Science and
Technology Project of the State Archives Administrator (Grant NO. 2015-
B-10), the open funding project of State Key Laboratory of Virtual Reality
Technology and Systems, Beihang University (Grant NO. BUAA-VR-16KF-
09), and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (NO.
2016LG03, 2016LG04).
Capture Secure Object Detection
Return the detecition result
…
…
Alice Bob



N
n
nh
1
))((sign)H( xx

  otherwiseh n
n
T
n
n ,
,)( 
 yxx
Fig. 1. Alice would like to detect objects in a collection of
sensitive surveillance images she own. Bob has an object de-
tection algorithm that he is willing to let Alice use, for a fee,
as long as she learns nothing about his detector. Alice is will-
ing to use Bob’s detector provided that he will learn nothing
about her images, not even the result of the object detection
operation [2].
where. Millions of surveillance cameras including the driv-
ing recorders captures images and videos every second. All
these conveniences devices are producing the large-scale vi-
sual media data, which is considered as the biggest big data.
Due to the limited storage space of these terminal devices,
large-scale visual media data is being uploaded and stored in
the cloud servers. Not only the storage, but also the process-
ing of large-scale visual media data are being outsourced to
the cloud servers.
The cloud servers have some strong algorithms such
as face/object detection, face/object recognition, intelligent
video surveillance. Nowadays, people can easily find all the
faces in their photos stored in the cloud servers using the
powerful face detection algorithms maintained by the cloud
servers. However, the cloud servers are always third party en-
tities. Thus the privacy of the users’ visual media data may be
leaked to the public or unauthorized parties.
In the meanwhile, the powerful cloud services for visual
media analysis and processing need a lot of money, data and
time from the cloud server producers. The cloud servers are
also reluctant to leak any parameters of the trained models or
some protected details of their algorithms with copyrights.
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Thus, the privacy of both the content of the visual media
from the clients and the parameters of the vision algorithms
from the cloud servers should be protected. 10 years ago, Avi-
dan & Butman introduced Blind Vision [2], which is a method
for securely evaluating a Viola-Jones type face detector. Blind
Vision uses standard cryptographic tools and is painfully slow
to compute, taking a couple of hours to scan a single image.
After that, rich literatures have been proposed in this field.
The cryptographic tools such as secret sharing (SS) [3], se-
curity multi-party computation (SMC) [4], homomorphic en-
cryption (HE) [5], garbed circuit (GC) [6], Chaotic System
(CS) [7] are heavily used. Plenty of computer vision applica-
tions have been modified to the privacy preserving or secure
versions such as private face detection [8], face recognition
[4], content based image retrieval [9], visual media search on
public datasets [10], intelligent video surveillance [3, 5, 6, 7].
However, most of these work rely heavily on crypto-
graphic tools, which are painfully slow to compute or need bit
by bit interaction between the clients and the cloud servers. In
this paper, we revisit the Blind Vision [2] and attempt to make
the blind vision towards cryptographic-free, without losing
the security properties. We use randomness and only a lit-
tle cryptographic operations to protect the visual media data
of the clients and the parameters of the trained models in the
cloud servers.
A novel image representation called Random Base Im-
age(RBI) representation is proposed. In this work, we also
investigate the object detection in the cloud. We apply our
RBI to the famous Viola and Jones object detection method
and propose a novel blind object detection method. We sep-
arate an image into random base images. The weight of each
base image is only known by the client. The base images are
sent randomly to the cloud server. The cloud server cannot
recover anything from the random base images. A random
vector and the secure Millionaire protocol [2] are leveraged
to protect the parameters of the trained object detector. The
RBI makes the integral-image enable again for the great ac-
celeration. The experimental results reveal that our method
is significantly faster than the traditional blind vision, with
only a very low probability of the information leakage theo-
retically.
2. SECURE OBJECT DETECTION
In this section we develop a secure object detector with the
random base image representation.
2.1. Notations
Our scenario and the notations are the same as that of tradi-
tional Blind Vision [2], as show in Figure 1. Denote some
L dimensions finite field F that is large enough to represent
all the intermediate results. Denote byX the image that Alice
owns. A particular detection window within the imageX will
be denoted by x ∈ FL and x will be treated in vector form.
Bob owns a strong classifier of the form
H(x) = sign(
N∑
n=1
hn(x)), (1)
where hn(x) is a threshold function of the form
hn(x) =
{
αn x
Tyn > θn
βn otherwise,
(2)
and yn ∈ FL is the hyperplane of the threshold function
hn(x). The parameters αn ∈ F, βn ∈ F and θn ∈ F of
hn(x) are determined during training; N is the number of
weak classifiers used.
2.2. The Random Base Image Representation
The core idea of our RBI is to separate the original image into
some random base images with fixed weights. The original
image can be recovered by all the base images. The sparse
representation can be considered as the one has such ability.
However, they need another image dataset for learning the
base images. Further more, there could be reconstruction er-
ror. Thus, we fix the weights and randomize the base images
themselves.
The detection window x can be represented as:
x =
M−1∑
i=0
wiBi, (3)
where Bi is the base image with weight wi. As is shown
in Figure 2, each base image has a fixed weight. The base
image itself is randomly determined. The number of the base
image is set to M = 256. Thus, each base image can be a
binary image, which is easy for network transfer and fast to
compute. In addition, there are 256! permutation of the base
image which is not easy to guess. The process of the RBI
generation is described in Algorithm 1.
2.3. Secure Object Detection with RBI
2.3.1. Secure Object Classifier Protocol
The core of our method is the secure object classifier proto-
col as is described in Algorithm 2 and Figure 3. For secure
object detection, Alice first divides the test image X into Q
detection windows {x1,x2, ...xQ}. Then the detection win-
dows are randomly sent to Bob as the inputs of the secure
face classifier protocol one by one. Using the Algorithm 2,
Alice and Bob know which detection windows are the target
objects. Because the detection windows are randomly sent to
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Fig. 2. The proposed Random Base Image Representation. For each single pixel px in the detection window x (px ∈ [0, 255]),
we randomly select S numbers pjx, j = 1, 2, ..., S, p
j
x ∈ [0, px] to represent px =
∑S
j=1 p
j
x. We fix the number of the base
image to M = 256 and set each weight wi = i. The initial value of each pixel in each base image is set to 0. Then we set the
corresponding pixel in each of the pjx
th base image Bi to 1: pBi = 1, i = p
j
x.
Algorithm 1 Random Base Image Factorization
Input:
The detection window x from the client image X
Output:
M random binary base images
B = {B0,B1, ...,BM−1}
1: Alice creates M binary images with all the pixels initial-
ized to 0. Each binary image has the same size as that of
the detection window x.
2: The weight of each binary image is set to wi = i, i =
0, 1, ...,M − 1.
3: Alice sets a index j = 1. For each pixel px in x, Alice
repeat the following 3 steps until px = 0.
(1) Alice generates a random number pjx ∈ [0, px].
(2) Set the corresponding pixel in the pjx
th base image Bi
to 1: pBi = 1, i = p
j
x.
(3) px = px − pjx, j = j + 1.
4: return B = {B0,B1, ...,BM−1}.
Bob, only Alice learns the location of all the detected faces
in the original image. Bob does not learn the contents includ-
ing where the faces are in the image of Alice. Alice learns
nothing about the parameters of the face detector of Bob.
The body of Algorithm 2 is described as follows:
• (1): Alice factorizes the detection window x into M
random base images B = {B0,B1, ...,BM−1} with
weight w = {w0, w1, ..., wM−1} = {0, 1, ...,M − 1}
through Algorithm 1.
• (2): Alice randomly shuffles the weight w to w′. The
Algorithm 2 Secure Object Classifier Algorithm with RBI
Input:
(1) Alice has input detection window x ∈ FL
(2) Bob has a strong classifier of the form H(x) =
sign(
∑N−1
n=0 hn(x))
Output:
(1) Alice has the result H(x) and nothing else
(2) Bob learns nothing about the detection window x
random base images B are permuted with the same
order of that of w′ = {w′0, w′1, ..., w′M−1} to B′ =
{B′0,B′1, ...,B′M−1}, which is sent to Bob.
• (3): In one cascade, Bob has N weak classifiers
with parameter vectors y = {y0,y1, ...yN−1}.
Bob randomly add K fake weak classifiers and set
their parameters α and β to zero. Bob randomly
shuffles the N + K true and fake weak classi-
fiers to form y′ = {y′0,y′1, ...y′N+K−1}. Then,
Bob generates N + K random positive numbers
s = {s0, s2, ..., sN+K−1}. For each parameter vector
y′n ∈ y′. Bob and Alice repeat the following 3 steps.
– (3.1): Bob computes the feature responses for
all the base image B′m in B
′ by Fm(n) =
B
′T
m y
′
n,m = 0, 1, ...,M−1. All theM responses
of base images B′ on each parameter vector y′n
are sent back to Alice.
– (3.2): Alice computes the feature responses
of the detection window x by F (n) =
∑M−1
m=0 Fm(n)w
′
m.
– (3.3): Alice and Bob use the secure Millionaire
protocol [2] to determine which number is larger:
F (n) or θn. Bob send αn+sn or βn+sn to Alice.
Alice store it as cn.
• (4): Alice and Bob use the secure Millionaire protocol
[2] to determine which number is larger:
∑N+K
n=1 cn or∑N+K
n=1 sn. If Alice has a larger number then x is posi-
tively classified, otherwise x is negatively classified.
2.3.2. Security
The protocol protects the security of both parties. The pro-
tocol protects the contents of the image from Alice and the
parameters of the face detector from Bob. We analyse the
security of Algorithm 2 in the following paragraph.
• From Alice to Bob
– In step 2, Alice send randomly shuffled base im-
ages to Bob. Bob only knows the randomly gen-
erated base images and do not know the weight of
each base image. The probability of guessing out
the right permutation is 1/M !. Even Bob guesses
out the right permutation, he does not know the
weight of each base image. Thus, it is almost im-
possible for Bob to recover the detection window
of Alice.
– In the 3th sub-step of step 3 and the step 4. Al-
ice and Bob engage in secure Millionaire protocol
[2]. so Bob can learn nothing about Alices data.
• From Bob to Alice
– In the 1st sub-step of step 3, Alice can not learn
the number of the weak classifiers N or the true
filters from the received feature responses. The
true filters are obfuscated by the fake filters.
– In the 3rd sub-step of step 3, Alice and Bob en-
gage in a secure Millionaire protocol so Alice
only learns if F (n) > θn. She can not learn any-
thing about the parameter θn. Moreover, at the
end of the Millionaire protocol Alice learns either
αn + sn or βn + sn. In both cases, the real pa-
rameter (αn or βn) is obfuscated by the random
number sn.
– In step 4, Alice and Bob use the secure Million-
aire protocol to determine which number is larger:∑N
n=1 cn or
∑N
n=1 sn. If Alice has a larger num-
ber then x is positively classified, otherwise x is
negatively classified.
• Multiple Cloud Servers
– The M random base images can be also sent to
multiple cloud server with the same object detec-
tor to increase security.
2.3.3. Complexity and Efficiency
The complexity of the protocol isO(M(N+K)L), whereM
is the number of the base images. N and K are the numbers
of the true and fake weak classifiers, respectively. L is the
dimensionality of the detection window x.
Unlike the traditional Blind Vision [2], in which the OT
operation is used extensively, the proposed method only use
OT operation to compare 2 numbers. In the secure dot-
product protocol, each pixel of each detection window uses
a OT 2561 operation, which needs 1 RSA encryption and 256
RSA decryption with 128-bit long encryption keys. We lever-
age ourM random images, whose computation is much faster
than the RSA encryption and decryption operations.
In addition, in the traditional Blind Vision [2], they con-
vert the integral-image representation to regular dot-product
operation, a step that clearly slows down their implementa-
tion as they no longer take advantage of the integral-image
representation. In our RBI based protocol, the integral-image
representation is enabled again, which accelerates the compu-
tation obviously.
3. EXPERIMENTS
We convert the Viola-Jones type object detector [1, 11] to our
secure object detector. We implement our RBI based object
detector using Microsoft Visual Studio 2012 and OpenCV
2.4.3/10. 1 package for computer vision in a 64 bits Windows
7 operating system. The hardware configuration is 3.5GHz
AMD A10 Pro-7800 R7 CPU with 12 compute Cores and
8GB Memory.
The face detector is from the OpenCV 2.4.3 package and
consists of a cascade of 22 rejectors, where each rejector is
of the form presented in Eq. 1. The first rejector consists of
3 weak classifiers. The most complicated rejector consists of
213 weak classifiers. There is a total of 2135 weak classifiers.
We also test the nose detector, the eye detector and the full
body detector from OpenCV 2.4.10.
3.1. The Detection Accuracy
We test our secure face detector in 3 face detection datasets:
The Face Detection Dataset (FDDB) [12], The Face96
Dataset [13], and The FEI Face Database [14].
We randomly select 100 face images from each of the 3
datasets. The detection accuracy (88.46%) of our secure face
detector is the same as that of the OpenCV 2.4.3 face detector
(88.46%).
1http://opencv.org/
Detection 
Window
M base images M base images
Generates 
randomly
Alice Bob
……
Sent to Bob 
Randomly
Weak 
classifier 
Strong 
classifier
Computes
Generates N+K random positive 
numbers 
Secure Millionaire Protocol 
Random
Shuffle
The classification result:
Positive / Negtive
1,...,0，)( ’nm  MmnF T'm yB
'
m
M
m wnFnF   10m )()( nθ
},...,{ 1 KNsss 
'
M
'
10,..., BB10,..., MBB



 ，
，c
nn
nn
n s
s

 nθnF )(
nθnF )(
Secure Millionaire Protocol 

KN
n
nc
1 


KN
n
ns
1

 ，
，Result Negtive
Positive  




KN
n
n
KN
n
n sc
11
otherwise



N
n
nh
1
))((sign)H( xx

  otherwiseh n
n
T
n
n ,
,)( 
 yxx
y
Fig. 3. The proposed secure object classifier.
The nose and the eye detectors are tested on the FDDB
dataset [12]. The full body detector is tested on the INRIA
Person dataset [15]. We randomly select 100 images from
each of the 2 datasets. The detection accuracy of our secure
object detectors is the same as that of the OpenCV 2.4.10
nose, eye and full body detectors.
3.2. Comparison with Other Methods
We compare our method with the Viola-Jones method imple-
mented by the OpenCV package and the method of the tradi-
tional Blind Vision [2]. 50 test images with size of 100× 100
are randomly selected from each of the 3 datasets. The av-
erage running time is shown in Table 1. All the methods
are running in client and server mode. For the Viola-Jones,
Alice send the original image to Bob. Then, Bob runs the
Viola-Jones method and return the detected windows to Alice.
Our method is slower than the Viola-Jones method, which is
running on plain images without protecting any privacy. Ac-
cording to the traditional Blind Vision method [2], the time-
consuming OT operation is heavily used and the integral-
image representation is disabled. Thus, they have to take a
couple of hours to scan a single image, which is painfully
slow. Although in our method, the only information that Bob
learns is that how many faces are in the image of Alice, our
cryptographic-free method is significantly faster than the pre-
vious work towards practical usage of blind vision applica-
tions.
In addition, we compare our method with the Viola-Jones
method implemented by the OpenCV package and the method
of the traditional Blind Vision [2]. 50 test images with size
of 100 × 100 are randomly selected from each of the FDDB
and the INRIA Person datasets. The average running times
are shown in the last 3 rows of Table 1. All the methods are
running in client and server mode.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
We propose a novel random base image representation (RBI)
for efficient object detection applications. The traditional
blind vision method applies secure multi-party techniques to
vision algorithm. Their method reveals no information to ei-
ther party at the expanse of heavy computation load. Our
method is an attempt towards cryptographic-free. Alice learns
nothing about the parameters of the face detector of Bob. Bob
does not know the contents of the image of Alice. The only in-
formation may be leaked is that Bob have a probability 1/M !
to guess out the right permutation of the base images. This is
just a theoretical event. Even Bob guesses out the right per-
mutation, he does not know the weight of each base image.
Thus it is almost impossible for Bob to learn the information
of the detection window of Alice. Because the heaviest cost
of OT operation in the secure dot-production of [2] is avoided
by our RBI based dot-production, the Millionaire version pro-
tocol of ours need much less time than the traditional blind
vision protocol does.
There are several extensions to this work. First is the need
to accelerate the secure blind vision to practical use, i.e. to re-
duce the time cost to near that of the vision algorithm without
security consideration. Second is to make both the training
and the test blind. This will make the client users to upload
Dataset Our Our + Comm. Delays VJ [11] VJ [11] + Comm. Delays Blind Vision [2]
FDDB-face 143.852s 380.992s 0.380s 0.843s A couple of
hours [8]Face96 173.471s 477.635s 0.358s 0.809sFEI 152.701s 414.522s 0.363s 0.827s
FDDB-nose 113.398s 294.845s 0.372s 0.836s A couple of
hours [8]FDDB-eye 85.754s 240.111s 0.496s 0.912sINRIA Person 80.204s 224.571s 0.333s 0.771s
Table 1. Average running time comparison with the Viola-Jones method [11] and the Blind Vision method [2] on the FDDB
[12], the Face96 [13] and the FEI [14] datasets. In the second and fourth columns, we simulate Alice and Bob on one PC
without communication delays. The third and fifth columns report the time costs in a private cloud environment.
more visual data to the cloud without worrying about the pri-
vacy leakage.
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